Epistemological Demarcations: the Boundary between Science and Metaphysics in the Work of Karl Popper

Abstract

This article presents an analysis and description of Karl Popper's reflections on the epistemological demarcation between science and metaphysics, with particular focus on the methodological relevance of his principle of falsifiability. Popper argued that a theory should be considered scientific only if it is susceptible to refutation through empirical testing. This criterion suggests that the ability of a theoretical system to be empirically tested and challenged is fundamental to ensuring the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Therefore, based on a multilateral methodology combining literature review, close reading, and creative writing, this study aims to investigate and elucidate the epistemological criteria that underlie Karl Popper's hypothetico-deductive ideas. In summary, the envisioned outcome of this conceptual adventure is to provide a theoretical/empirical demonstration of the significant contributions of the contemporary thinker to the philosophy of science.